Since the 1850's, Russia had sought to consolidate the Far-Eastern tracks of its Empire
At the time, its ambitions found little resistance in China, weakened by internal strife and English-French colonial encroachments
Giving way to Russian pressure, China ceded, by the treaty of Aigun (1858), the territory north of the Amur river, together with the maritime region east of the Ussuri (Wusuli) River from the mouth of the Amur to the boundary of Korea
After Japan's exchange of the Sakahlin Island for the Kurile Islands (1875), the start of the Trans-Siberian railway construction in 1891, and its military potential, rekindled interest for Asian expansion at the Court of Saint Petersburg
The goal of Nicolas II, Tsar from 1894, to ensure an ice-free port in the Pacific further gained momentum with China's lease of the warm water harbor town of Port Arthur (Lüshun) - 1898 - in the bay between northern China and Korea
As things stood, the near-completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway by 1905 would allow Russia to bring its full military weight to bear on anyone countering Russia's power projection in the region
Japan, back in January 1904, sought to reach agreement with Russia - a treaty of mutual territorial guarantees in Mandchuria and in Korea
With the restoration of the Meiji emperor (1868), the country had entered an era of economic reform with dramatic speed, modernizing its army and navy along the way
Aiming to establish its authority over Korea, the country had confronted China, which led to various crises, ultimately to war in 1894-1895 and victory with strategic territorial cessions to Japan (Treaty of Shimonoseki)
Japan's entreaties in 1904 were ignored by the Tsar and his council
From Russia's perspective, there was no reason to rein in geographical expansion and confidence in the country's military strength was running high
And, as Minister of Interior (and confidant of the Tsar) Vyacheslav Plehve asserted, Russia's dismal domestic situation could be improved no end by a 'victorious little war'
Victorious little wars...
The war of 1904 -1905 between Japan and Russia laid bare the sadly familiar train of lax planning, military incompetence, corruption and overconfident fatuity, in confrontation with a determined opponent
In truth, Japan's growing military strength had not gone unnoticed by Russia's Minister of War, General Aleksey Kuropatkin, but plans to pivot Russia's interests north, to the up-and-coming harbor of Vladivostok and away from Japan's intended sphere of influence, went nowhere
Expansion in East Asia, with Mandchuria the ultimate prize, was too tempting for the Russian Court (and its commercial interests) to let go
Taken by surprise by Japan's opening gambit, an attack on its navy base at Port Arthur in January 1904 - Russia's navy squadron suffered heavy losses and ended up blockaded for months
On land and at sea, the Japanese military proved superior more often than not, even though both countries encountered immense logistical challenges and suffered grievous losses
Russia transferred close to half a million men and 100 000 horses to Mandchuria - and, in pitch fever, sent its Baltic fleet around the globe, to meet its fate, many months later, off the island of Tsushima in May 1905, where the Japan's navy, superior in speed and armament, sunk two-thirds of the Russian fleet
With Russia's prestige as a great power badly shaken and Japan's military and financial capacity exhausted by a war of attrition, US mediation (initiated by Japan) was accepted by both parties
Held by American President Theodor Roosevelt at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine (August 1905), the peace conference enacted - by the Treaty of Portsmouth - the growing influence of Japan in South Asia, setting the stage for another Japanese war, less than a generation later in Mandchuria (1931-1932)
Theodore Roosevelt was (controversially) awarded the Peace Prize in 1906
As Mark Twain asserted, "history never repeats itself, but it does often rhyme"
Instead of learning from past experience, governments will, time and again, entrust the destinies of entire countries to their strong beliefs in superiority, deep convictions of being in the right and unwarranted guarantees to come out on top
In context, experience and uncomfortable facts, supporting alternative assumptions, will be swatted away, as inconvenient, confusing and distracting side-issues
The contradiction between belief and fact fosters ambiguity and discomfort by muddling clear-cut, opinionated cases of war and of peace put forward by powerful rulers
Such dissonance causes anguish - a recipe for poor governance the world over, only very much more so under authoritarian regimes
Cognitive dissonance
Cognitive dissonance is a psychological phenomenon described as the discomfort caused by contradictory thoughts, ideas or plain facts
Dissonance tends to be resolved by repressing the contradiction between idea and behavior - or between ingrained opinion and fact on the ground
The defense mechanisms fall into three categories
- by avoiding or ignoring discomfort - plodding on...
- by undermining, delegitimizing or discrediting the facts that highlight the dissonance
- by belittling the importance of the contradiction, limiting the impact of ideas (or facts) inconsistent with closely held beliefs
Causing discomfort at the personal level, such contradictions
between opinion and fact,
between belief and reality,
or between feeling and obligation to act ...
is no less critical on the world stage
Cognitive dissonance on the world stage is wildly more critical because subjective choices tend to crystallize around a leader, creating layer upon impenetrable layer of questionable certainty
Cognitive dissonance of authoritarian power
On the world stage, governments will contrive to repress the contradictions between belief and reality
For regimes of undisputed authority, it does not bode well...
Referring to absolute power under Tsar Nicolas I, Emperor of Russia (from 1825 to 1855), and with eerie foresight, the Marquis de Custine, a French aristocrat on tour in Russia in 1839, anticipated its defining traits in Russia, from Stalin onward...
In Russia, everything you notice, and everything that happens around you, has a terrifying uniformity...
and the first thought that comes into the traveler's mind, as he contemplates this symmetry, is that
such entire consistency and regularity, so contrary to the natural inclination of mankind, cannot have been achieved and could not survive without violence. . . .
To further the point, U.S. diplomat George Kennan discusses Custine's insights how contradictions were crushed, and subjective choices went unquestioned, under the aegis of Tsar Nicolas I
As quoted in Professor John L. Gaddis' biography
...the absolute power of a single man; his power over thoughts as well as actions
...the impermanence and unsubstantiality of all subordinate distinctions of rank and dignity - the instantaneous transition from lofty stations to disgrace and oblivion
Echo chambers
War on Ukraine has raised the abuse of power on the European continent to a fever-pitch
And the century-old resilience of the Russian people under authoritarian regimes does not hold promise of a pull-back
Locked in an echo chamber of their own making, having put their trust in an all-knowing authority, the Russian people cling to certainties at hand, however inflated, abusive or deceitful they may be
In their majority, the Russians may actually have an inkling of the lies trumpeted by manipulative and mendacious authorities
However, dissonance - the contradiction between sensitive opinion and hard facts - pervades the geopolitics of Western governments as well, in direct opposition to Russia's heedless adventurism
...fostering no less vivacious echo chambers
Western echo chambers are in part dignified response to the tragic suffering of the Ukrainian people, in part excited stirrings on social networks working overtime
Caught in a vis between the daily display of courage by the Ukrainian people, military as well as civilian, and the mistrust sewn by Russia's actions, the West lacks strategic insights
Strategy is to break free from echo chambers and to 'think outside the box' in a familiar saying
The lack of articulate strategic choices, breaking loose from echo chambers, is hardly reassuring
There would be a price to be paid, as William Pitt, 1st Earl of Chatham - in his condemnation of the British war against the American Colonies in 1777 - stated with brilliant rhetoric
That war "was unjust in its principles, impractical in its means and ruinous in its consequences"
So it is again to this day