The fraught relationship between NATO members, between U.S. and its European partners, and between those European countries themselves, has painted a picture of disjointed priorities
Our series on NATO, published over the past year, sets the tone
- NATO - The meaning of Article 5
- NATO - Pick your umbrella before the rain...
- NATO Spending - Golden promises or tin coins ?
The dark shadow cast on the 75-year anniversary celebration of the Alliance in 2024 has not lifted
U.S. military doctrine and European political engagement remain poles apart, but, with war in the trenches of Eastern Ukraine, a very different paradigm is emerging
The terms of military engagement, as defined by NATO doctrine, look out of date, and the political commitments of European members of the Alliance, awkwardly subsumed under promises of hard cash, will not do
By compelling NATO associates, including the U.S., to face the realities of the battlefield, a shared understanding may yet emerge
Fresh from his service as Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2021-2024, Valeriy Zaluzhnyy could be one of many voices for truthtelling
Projecting military analysis, combat operations and tactics into the future, Zaluzhnyy is blunt
"In a year's time, we must know for sure that we have allies who can produce the weapons we will need in a year's time"
In his interview with Ukrainian publication LB.ua, Valeriy Zaluzhnyy shares his views
- on rethinking military strategy in an age of technological upheaval,
- on NATO's challenges to take practical collective action in a radically updated defense system
- and on the way to nurture a network of partners in the defense industry
Our NATO series will be updated for new publication coming this autumn
Technological upheaval
“The war battle is a frightful competition of industries, and victory is the success of the competitor that managed to work faster and more ruthlessly. Here the era from which we come shows its cards. The domination of the machine over man, of the servant over the master, becomes apparent..."
So writes the conservative (and militarist) German author Ernst Jünger of his experience on the Western front (from 1914 to 1918), in Feuer und Blut, published precisely one hunderd years ago, in 1925
Technology has become the essence of battle, leaving the troops exposed to mechanical deaths they could not, and still cannot envision
The muddy swamps of the Battle of the Somme (July-November 1916) left more than a million British men dead, slaugthered on an industrial scale by bombardments they never could see coming - it was, with Verdun (leaving 700 000 French and German soldiers dead over 300 days, that same year 1916), a tragic opening on a new reality
As chief of staff to the German Inspectorate of Motorized Troops from 1931, Heinz Guderian was at the center of Germany's development of mobile warfare and armored forces; taking the doctrine of mechanized offensive warfare with the panzer division to heart, Guderian was to apply the strategy leading to the early German victories in Belgium and in France (1940)
German technology and U.S. technology went head to head in the Battle of Normandy when U.S. led Operation Cobra (July 25, 1944) finished obliterating the German elite Panzer-Lehr division by a massive aerial bombardment with over 1,500 allied bombers - that day, the division suffered more than 1 000 casualties (out of 2 200 combat troops remaining) and by August, the Panzer Lehr had 33 tanks left out of more than 200 early June
This is what industrial warfare did ...and could do again
New age technological warfare
During his interview, Zaluzhnyy is careful not to criticize the Western military establishment, and fully aware of the challenges of democratic governments to gain and maintain support of their own people
Still, wrestling with the unbroken march of "domination of the machine over man", Zaluzhnyy is alarmingly clear-eyed about the disconnect between military technology, advancing at breakneck speed on the Ukrainan combat front, the slow reform process of NATO doctrine and the backward looking defense budgetary policies of NATO members
From a military perspective, weapon sytems remain indispensable, but cumulative deliveries of equipment, bankrolled by NATO, will never win the day on their own in times of pressing need
The Ukrainian General would surely confirm that access to Western weapons defined the outcome in the first stages of the war (2022-2023)
However, as the conflict wore on, under urgent pressure, technology became decisive in giving hardware a fighting chance
If the war on Ukrainian territory has taught anything, it is how fast evolving technology has come to dominate, integrating weaponry delivered by NATO with innovations to attack or to defend
In many ways, the rhythm of technology innovation has come to define the rhythm on the battlefield
New weapons, for Valeriy Zaluzhnyy, "entail new tactics of use, new forms and methods of use. New forms and methods of use entail new structures in which they are used. As a result, there is a need for a new doctrine of use, a new training system, and new funding"
Drones and and Mobile Fire
Drones, and the countering of adversarial drones, have proven to be decisive in every dimension discussed by Valeriy Zaluzhnyy
- FPV (first-person-view) drones, controlled remotely by radio-frequency, were used successfully and in very large numbers by Ukrainian, as well as by Russian forces
- The saturation of drones over the buffer zone between Ukrainian and Russian forces - in effect, a killing zone where no soldier could venture - stabilized the line of contact on a width of 10-15 kms and this freeze made it difficult for Russian troops to restart an offensive
As long as it lasted..
Improvement in jamming technologies, on both sides of the conflict, has unleashed a race for 'unjammable' drones, by fiber optics, giving the Russians the upper hand for a time...
The new 'new' technology has upended the old new drone tactics in a matter of months, putting the onus on production capacity at great volume - and Russia's military-industrial complex has been winning
By extending the buffer zone of maximum exposure from 15 kms to 50 kms, on the Ukrainian side, "they [the Russians] knocked out our logistics, completely cut off the supply routes for ammunition, food, evacuation of the wounded, etc. ", according to the General
Turning to another example of technology which went from inventive marvel to the scrapheap, mobile fire groups (MFGs) were countering Russian aerial drone attacks, and the Russian had been equally active in implementing the technology
But that was then...but...
By flying their Iranian "Shaheed" drones at altitudes of 2 000 meters, the Russians "calmly fly across the entire territory of Ukraine to Kyiv and are already beginning, so to speak, to bomb the city with ‘debris’"
The point made by the General, is widely understood as deterministic in warfare and multifacetted
- technology is a fast-moving target
- technology must to be produced in large volumes to be cheap
"You have to think not about what you need today. You have to think about what you will need in a year, or two, or three"
“Whatever weapon system or munition you shoot at another adversary’s capability, it should be cheaper than what you’re shooting down”, confirms Army Gen. Christopher Donahue, commander of U.S. land forces in Europe and Africa
Stalemate by technological parity
Bringing his argument about technological process to a head, General Zaluzhnyy defines stalemate
- Going forward, troop moblisation is an option neither in Ukraine, nor in Russia - the Russian demographics just do not allow to mobilize in St. Petersburg, Moscow and other ‘classy’ cities and send the troops into the drone-dominated killing fields
- The economics of warfare are winding down, citing the 500 drones which flew into Ukraine 'yesterday', requiring according to NATO standards, three missiles for each target, 1 500 missiles (with top of range IRIS-T missiles costing $800 000)
Central to modern warfare, technology gives the upperhand to advanced research, industrial production capacities, relentless military training to master the latest technologies and tactical flexibility on the battlefield
A tall order...taller still when the adversary shares identical priorities in a similar timeframe
The end game is within reach according to Zaluzhnyy because "new age" technologies, and the means of their implementation, are global, quashing any marginal, and very temporary, advantage of one party...
With technological parity, any differentiating edge, which might entice a 'strong man' to act, will reveal itself to be a mirage
In the end, as NATO doctrine is likely to recognize, the voiding of the frontline, emptied of human presence and dominated by technology, will dictate its own finality
As General Zaluzhnyy, states matter-of-factly, following a freeze in the fighting, "it will be very difficult to lead the soldiers to slaughter again"