The article entitled ‘the End of the Beginning’ called for an understanding of the vivacious Russian society to shed a ray of light on the tragic confrontation between Russia and Ukraine and to highlight all this great country stands to lose
Cutting through the clutter and setting aside dubious assumptions about President Putin’s intentions,
the confusion and the expectations of Russian society should take center stage in post-war planning
While much has been made of polling suggesting massive support of the military operations in Ukraine, realities are in all likelihood more complex and harder to interpret
In a regime edging towards fully committed autocracy, it has always been difficult to map a truly reliable image of popular sentiment
What is more, conflict favors a natural propensity to ‘rally to the flag’
However, confusion about the goals pursued by Russia is no less apparent in the polling as – inevitably – news filters through about a disastrous military campaign and civilian deaths which can only be ascribed to ‘actors’ for so long
Squeezing the media, the Russian regime has been relaying a narrative which could have been effective in framing public opinion if… and only if… it had been consistent
And obviously, it is not
Brains are draining away
Neither the failed assault on Ukraine’s capital Kyiv, nor the promised uprising of pro-Russian populations in Eastern Ukraine, nor the demise of Moskova, the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, (because of an on-board fire, then by storm, towed to safety but ending at the bottom of the Black Sea...) must have fully convinced even the most die-hard supporters of the regime
Worse however is the clear divide opened up within Russia between assertive and socially engaged classes, which could not be left in the dark for long, and an often older and less urbanized population, which has entrusted its destiny to its leader
While small on the scale of the country, the massive emigration of Information Technology (IT) specialists speaks volumes
The Russian Association for Electronic Communications told the lower house of Russia’s parliament in March that 50,000 to 70,000 tech workers have left the country, with 100,000 more expected to leave over the next month (April), with destinations as diverse as the Baltic States, Kazakhstan or Turkey (where Russians are said to be squatting the cafés and all available office space in Istanbul)
At approx. 10% of the sector’s workforce, the exodus has raised great concern at established firms such as search engine and web portal giant Yandex Invalid tag asset, which weighs establishing subsidiaries in those same countries, while start-ups have moved along with their personnel
As if to confirm the risks to which ‘post-war’ Russia could be exposed, under the assumption that many of those recent migrants never will return, the Russian prime minister has announced a raft of incentives by decree - freeing IT companies from income tax and inspections, and granting them access to cheap loans - and offering IT workers subsidized housing, attractive mortgage rates, salary increases and no income tax for the next three years
Notably, the decree signed by President Putin also grants IT workers an exemption from conscription into military service, something many young Russians have sought to avoid by leaving the country
Globally, the flow of emigrants is hard to pinpoint
The economic cycle has impacted the trends up and down, depending on job opportunities…from 2011 to 2020, official data recognize 3.1 million departures
Because only those unregistering from their place of residence are counted, actual departures are estimated at three to four times higher than shown officially - 9 to 12 million people presumalby left over the decade
Higher educated and skilled people dominate the migration flow (est. 43%) – with departures of scientists running at 200 000 per year according to Geopolitical Intelligence Services (GIS)
Low-skilled labor is draining as well
More rarely in the limelight, migrants from former Soviet States of Central Asia have been returning home in large numbers, since February – with 2 million already gone with an additional 2 million considering to move – out of an assumed total migrant population of 12 million people (2020 data)
The number of labor migrants vary wildly since most enter from post-Soviet states without a visa and work illegally in Russia – from 4.9 million (Russian Statistical Service) to 32.6 million (Federal Security Service)
Whatever the more credible estimate may be, the sheer number of migrants highlights Russia’s chronic shortage of low-skilled labor
If the recent departures are confirmed, they will weigh on the classes of young Russians at draft age, since many of them will be required to take over the jobs of the departed migrants…
News (mostly bad) keeps coming
Another silent ballot, cast day after day, has been the stellar adoption rate of VPN apps, for access to international and American news aggregators, formally blocked in Russia but still easily accessible by private network
From a daily average of 15 000, VPN downloads have skyrocketed to 475 000 per day in March before dropping back to 200 000 / 300 000 daily lately…still a highway of information which the Russian authorities attempted to block by forcing Google to delist the apps (36 000 VPN Internet URLs in all)
The huge increase in VPN use speaks volumes the doubts hanging over the drip-feed of doctored official information networks
While Russia may be hemmed in by a raft of authoritarian directives, depriving the population of trusted news feeds, the fact is that a highly educated society will be cognizant of international affairs, however much the Russian regime would like to prove otherwise
Keen awareness of the limits of the controls dictated by his own regime, Mr. Putin may not be able to withstand a drawn-out face-off on the battlefield against the Ukrainian military (and Western weapons)
The focus on hard fights and Russian military excesses, thoroughly documented by the Western media, will only say so much
- Tenacity of the Russian people and command of deep human and material resources cannot be doubted, tempting the Russian leadership to double down
- Poor logistics, indiscipline and low moral or downright criminal abuse by military clans running havoc might just tip the balance the other way
In fact, neither factor – not the impressive and untapped backbone of Russia’s military capacity and not the damning spectacle of military disorganization – is likely to change Mr. Putin’s unflappable calculations
Demography rules
This is because losses on the battlefield can always be reversed
However, from the scars left by demographic accidents, brutal population losses related to pandemics, to wars and to economic crisis, society recovers in the long run at best....
The 20-24 years old Russian males, presumably the first in line for conscription into military service, are 5.1% of total males (out of a total male population of 67.64 million) - compared to 6.9% in the U.S. (total male population 162.83 million)
While the percentage points difference may go unnoticed, absolute differences are huge - Russia 3.45 million young men - U.S. 11.25 million
In so many words, Russia has to spare every one of its children and every single soldier lost in a war comes at an exceedingly high price...
Worsening the outlook, society may not recover at all when gifted and highly educated age groups are departing
The transformative factor is the hemorrhaging of Russia’s valuable talents and the disaffection of those who stay put
Departures of qualified IT workers are front-running a critical trend with 43% of Russian migrants ranking as ‘highly educated’, according to OECD data
At the high end of estimates for the past decade (2011-2020), if another 12 million people were prepared to emigrate, Russia would essentially lose all prospects for the future as the emigrants would be coming from an age group representing the future itself
Polling the 19-24 years old in Russia in 2019, GIS got this answer to the question “What makes you want to leave your country most of all?”
a desire to provide our children with a decent future abroad; poor economic conditions in Russia; better medical services abroad; and the political situation in Russia
Looking dire in quality, demographics are worse still in sheer volume
With a fertility rate disastrously low at 1.5 child per couple, well below the replacement rate of 2.1, the population of Russian nationals is going down, a trend worsened by excess Covid deaths, estimated at more than 1 million between March 2020 and January 2022 (source FT - Rosstat – John Hopkins CSSE) dwarfing official data set at 360 000 deaths
Gimmicks such as including the population of Crimea in federal statistics, providing broad access to Russian passports in the statelets of Donesk and Luhansk and implementing financial incentives to benefit 'returnees' cannot and have not compensated demographic losses for ever
As the economic sanctions decided by the West take hold, the downturn will impact family income immeasurably, with revenue loss of 10 to 15% by 2023 estimated by economists but not yet reflected in individual choices
Translating directly in family income, birth rates, already dismal, are expected to take another hit, with an additional 10% fall in birth rates seemingly pre-ordained, with extremely grave consequences for the country’s standing in the world
At the negotiating table, Russia has little to offer and much to lose
If demographic trends are fundamental to Russia's future as it appears, the time for a 'grand bargain' is now