NATO - The meaning of Article 5

by Pininvest Analysis
NATO - The meaning of Article 5
Aiden Marples - Cornerstones in many shades of grey / Unsplash

NATO’s website is crystal clear

"Article 5 is the cornerstone of the Alliance. It means that an attack on one is an attack on all"

 

The article has been invoked repeatedly in recent years but there are many reasons to wonder if the reference is as straightforward as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would like to suggest

During the Trump presidency, amidst much handwringing on the part of America’s European allies, the Treaty was shown for what it was – a fragile ‘fallback’ option rather than the full commitment of unstinting allies, holding on to a tenuous shared military interest in a peaceful setting

With media focus on Mr. Trump's brutal questioning of the actual commitments of America's counterparts in the Alliance, adult discussions about the terms of military engagement today, 75 years after the Treaty's signature, have been deliberately left in the dark

This should not be so 

  • In 1949, at launch of the Alliance, Western Europe was a shambolic patchwork of countries bankrupted by the war - not the economic powerhouse of today's European Union 
  • Then, the danger of Soviet aggression was coming into focus in Austria, in Greece and in Italy and whatever his criminal intent, President Putin bears no comparison with Josef Stalin
  • The US emerged from World War II as hegemon, uniquely able to buttress its military power with economic dominance - today's multipolar world is different and America is moving on

Admittedly, these facts are not compelling arguments to take the risky step to review and update the Treaty; there has been little urgency to raise uncomfortable questions on either side of the Atlantic and the 'iconic' value of the Alliance - and of Article 5 - has, after all, stood the test of time 

However, the fast-evolving technology of warfare cannot so easily be ignored

Real commitments of the NATO allies in conventional war, in nuclear engagement and in cyber attack need to be spelled out and it will not be an easy task


"Brain death"

In a much-commented catchphrase, President Macron criticized NATO's lack of coordination of strategic decision-making between the United States and its NATO allies

Strategically and politically, Mr. Macron believed at the time (in 2021) that the Treaty was subject to 'brain death' but sidestepped the implications of his, undoubtedly correct, diagnosis

The ambiguity derived from combining "the military level and the strategic level" in his critique of NATO's lack of coordination

Each of those levels in fact raises complex issues in its own right. They are not two sides of the same coin ...

Arguably, in the French narrative, the strategic level translates seamlessly into military options because the protection of territorial integrity is the State's exclusive responsibility and military defense its inalienable prerogative 

This view has never been shared without caveats by the country's NATO allies which recognized the preeminent role of the U.S.

However, there indeed is a structural contradiction in the build-up of the Alliance between equally sovereign States going back to 1949

 

Central military command and military efficiency

From the start, in 1949, the U.S. has been the undisputed driving force of the Alliance, taking on the responsibilities and the benefits of 'leader of the Free World' 

With vast (and, early on, the only) resources at the disposal of the Alliance, America had the means - and the political motivation following the coup in Czechoslovakia (February 1948) and the Berlin Blockade (June 1948 - May 1949) - to organize and to control NATO's military standing to its own blueprint

The implications were not accepted by the European allies out of weakness but out of  hard security concerns in a potential confrontation with Soviet expansionism

However, the implicit loss of control over territorial protection by sovereign states was bound to fester into shameful dereliction for some, into resigned lobbying of specific state interests for others

Inevitably, under the weight of their own singular history, with quite distinct perceptions of risk due to their geographic locations, and in the thrall of democratic expectations of their countrymen, the States tended to drift

Fragmentation of their priorities kept gaining momentum ever since

 

If the Alliance is still holding while racked by so many contradictions, look no further than American military command where pragmatism rules

True to the American 'can-do' attitude of getting the job done, the U. S. has exercised its responsibilities to the full on a case-by-case basis, under the assumption that problems, as they arise, usually have a proper solution, disconnected from the larger context

Indispensable and effectively a self-fulfilling evidence, American leadership in NATO held on to the primary purpose of Continental security on military terms, a success which nurtures the seeds of its own destruction

Military command relies the political engagement of a democratically elected leadership, which translates uneasily into policies of an array of countries, however much concern about their security prevails

NATO is a paradox at heart

 

Since American superiority in all things military remains a given, it should come as no surprise that the European allies sought to assert their own commitment to the Alliance on the political plane

Drawing a clear distinction between military and strategic levels (which Mr. Macron in his statements did not), the Allies elevated NATO as symbol of their collective peace

They did so in their own special ways, with security concerns hardwired by a tortured past (all of the actors on the European Continent had their share....) and with democratic support of their citizens

As it turns out, the European Allies have been resilient but their finely tuned political commitments to NATO only will hold as long as the military framework has explicit support of America

To be convinced of the sensitivity of NATO symbolism, look no further than Europe's panicked reaction to Mr. Trump's transactional provocations

In truth, symbols are not available for trade 

 

 A defensive military strategy in the nuclear age

Article 5 of the Treaty has an iconic status, precisely because the U.S. commitment was undisputable, cast in stone in 1949, guaranteeing European security under the protective nuclear umbrella of the world's sole superpower

By the late 1950's, nuclear weapon technology started to reshuffle the cards in a major way 

Nuclear deterrence was not any longer America's privilege, defining a unique defensive strategy, but the foundation of a mighty duopoly, shared with the Soviet Union

Nuclear technology soon multiplied the options for the potential aggressor in a 'first' strike and for defensive responses - ranging from tactical to strategic bombing and diversifying the missile systems (and their locations on land, in the sea and in the air)

 

From the American perspective, nuclear engagement was - quite logically - the sole responsibility of U.S. military command and foundational to the Treaty 

  •  Strongly supported by the European allies in 1949, nuclear response was unquestionably the ultimate guarantee of security in case of Soviet aggression, underwriting Article 5 in the most explicit format
  • Full U.S. control of the terms of nuclear engagement was a prerequisite, on the technical and on the political planes
  • By choosing to enhance their own security interests with nuclear arsenal, the UK (with American assistance) and France from 1961, pressed diplomatic side-agreements of engagement on NATO, much to American displeasure
  • In doing so, blotting the sharp edge of American strategy, these countries gave the clearest signal that America's unequivocal protective stance was reaching its limit

 

From the Allied perspective, the loss of a simple narrative was existential; buttressed by Article 5, a nuclear response had to be accounted for as near-certainty by the Soviet Union in a 'first strike' scenario

  • Cognizant of strong US isolationist trends before World War II, and of the risk of a potential American nuclear retreat, European allies had made sure early on of the presence of American troops on European soil, in larger numbers than technically justified
  • Psychologically unprepared to reckon with novel nuclear technologies, the Allies misinterpreted the evolving U.S. doctrine of military engagement on the European Continent during the Kennedy Administration
  • Introducing flexibility in an American response to a Soviet strike, by making full use of a range of nuclear weapons in combination with conventional armies, these strategies had theoretical merit
  • However, the novel approach turned the political commitment of the European Allies upside down, by putting military options (and not symbols) at the center of national debates, in Germany and elsewhere

 

Dating back from 1961, flexibility sought by the U.S. military strategists for engagement exposed the dilemma throughout the Cold War

Endless tweaking of interpretations did not resolve the fundamental contradiction of control and command of nuclear strikes with the European allies' sovereignty

Marking short shrift of the symbol attached by the Europeans to Article 5, flexibility translated, in the Allies' perception, with uncertainty 

Lacking proper answers, fragmentation of the Alliance, already a clear concern for the last 60 years, has festered as the symbolism of mutual support lost its shine

 

A post-Cold War setting

To revive the meaning of Article 5, the European nuclear powers (the U.K. and France) will have to make the hardest decisions if shared European deterrence is to become reality

The linchpin of this strategic shift is likely to be the conciliation between French nuclear security and German (and Polish) guarantees on the frontlines of Central Europe's war theater

Its merit in deterring aggression on the European Continent will be discussed in a forthcoming note